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We measure the impact of a business training program for female 
microentrepreneur clients of a group banking program in Peru. Using the credit with 
education model, we assigned clients randomly to either treatment or control groups. 
Treatment groups received thirty to sixty minute entrepreneurship training sessions 
during their normal weekly group banking meeting. These lasted between one to two 
years. Control groups remained as they were before, meeting weekly with the group 
banking program solely for making loan and savings payments. We find that intention 
to treat (ITT) led to higher repayment and client retention rates for the microfinance 
institution, improved business knowledge, and practices. More importantly, average 
business sales revenues also increase while revenues fluctuations were reduced. In 
addition, we find significant heterogeneity in the exposure of clients within the treatment 
group. Treatment on the treated (TOT) estimates, obtained using ITT as instrumental 
variable, show substantially larger effects. 
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1. Introduction 
The microfinance sector grew substantially over the past two decades with the 
hope of helping reduce poverty. Yet, existing programs and institutions have not been 
able to deliver on that promise (Morduch, 1998; 1999). Now, it is increasingly clear that 
the microfinance revolution may not be enough for the task and additional innovations 
are required. 
Microfinance practitioners around the world are actively pursuing innovations 
that can help enhance their contribution to the welfare of their clients. A strong trend in 
these innovations is the combination of microfinance with other non-financial services, 
including business training (Dunford, 2002). This trend has caused tension in the 
development microfinance community with questions about whether lenders should 
specialize in financial services only, or should integrate non-financial services into their 
programs (MkNelly, Watetip et al. 1996). The idea that specialization is good is 
certainly not new, but in this setting it has yet to be tested whether the economies of 
scope outweigh the risks of having credit officers simultaneously become “teachers.” 
Aside from losing focus on the lending and savings activities, providing too detailed 
business advice may lead to higher default if the borrower then perceives the lender as 
partially responsible for any business changes that do not succeed. 
Business training programs being implemented for small and micro-enterprises 
in developing countries are strikingly heterogeneous, including hands-on training, 
technical assistance and/or basic principles based on best practices by successful 
microentrepreneurs, but little is known about their impact on economic outcomes for 
the poor
1. Here, we focus on an intervention that aims to teach entrepreneurship by 
transmitting recognized best business practices to female microentrepreneurs, with 
facilitators avoiding to offer advice on specific actions as they could later be blamed if 
something goes wrong. However, we could imagine that entrepreneurship is not a 
matter of a specific process being replicated, as it is a matter of the intuition of the 
microentrepreneur about the when and how of using the intervention, or the 
determination in doing it, as these are abilities that can be hardly taught. 
In this paper, we evaluate the marginal impact of adding such entrepreneurship 
training to a microfinance program in Peru. We do that by implementing a randomized 
                                                 
1 See, for instance, Middleton, Ziderman and van Adams (1993). 
3 control trial to compare outcomes between those who receive financial services only 
and those who receive business training as well as financial services. The study was 
conducted with FINCA-Peru, a microfinance institution (MFI) that sponsors village 
banks for poor, female microentrepreneurs in Lima and Ayacucho in Peru. We 
randomly assigned pre-existing lending groups to either treatment or control. Treatment 
groups received the training as part of their mandatory weekly meetings. Control 
groups remained as they were before, a credit and savings-only group. We conducted 
a baseline survey before the intervention and a follow-up survey after between one and 
two years. We find strong benefits for the microfinance institution in the form of higher 
loan repayment and client retention. We also find improved business processes and 
knowledge by the clients, an increase in business sales and a reduction in the 
fluctuations of business revenue. 
In addition, we analyze the way the program was delivered. We analyze the 
level of client participation in the training module and explore the factors that explain 
large differences in the exposure to treatment. We find that the main factor is length of 
the permanence as bank client and not the lack of interest in training or lack of 
satisfaction with the course in itself. We estimated treatment on the treated (TOT) 
estimates by using the intention to treat (ITT) as instrumental variable, and find TOT 
estimates are significantly larger than ITT ones. 
This paper is organized in seven sections including this introduction. Section 2 
presents the nature of the intervention and basic hypothesis. Section 3 explains the 
experimental design and section 4 details the data collected and empirical strategy. 
Section 5 presents the results of the impact analysis based on the ITT estimates, while 
section 6 analyzes heterogeneity in exposure to treatment among clients in treatment 
banks and discusses the TOT estimates. Finally, section 7 concludes. 
2.  The intervention and its expected effects 
We measure the impact of adding business training sessions to a microfinance 
program for female microentrepreneurs in a group banking program in urban and rural 
areas in Peru. The goal of the business training intervention is two-fold: to improve 
business outcomes and overall welfare for clients and to improve institutional outcomes 
for the microfinance institution. Stronger business may demand more services, and 
clients may be less likely to default if they are satisfied (either due to higher cash flow 
or a stronger feeling of reciprocity). But the two goals do not need to reinforce each 
other. If business increases enough that clients “graduate” to larger formal sector 
4 banks, providing the business training could lead to lower client retention for this 
organization. 
FINCA-Peru is a small, non-profit, but financially sustainable, MFI that has been 
operating in Peru since 1993. FINCA-Peru’s mission is to improve the socio-economic 
situation of the poor and empower women through the promotion of the village-banking 
methodology. By providing them with working capital to increase inventory and invest in 
their businesses, FINCA expects to increase the earned income of its clients, primarily 
poor women with no collateral. In addition to providing credit, FINCA teaches its clients 
to save by requiring weekly or monthly savings deposits that correspond to the size of 
the loan the client has taken out and by encouraging additional voluntary savings for 
which they receive market interest rates. FINCA further empowers clients by giving 
them the opportunity to run their banks through their rotating participation on the 
village-bank board. 
FINCA has operations in three particularly poor districts of Lima, and in two 
Andean provinces, Ayacucho and Huancavelica. As of June 2003, FINCA sponsored 
273 village banks with a total of 6,429 clients, 96 percent of which were women. The 
total savings of its client base was US$1,630,823 with US$821,172 in outstanding 
loans. FINCA members, particularly those in Ayacucho, are relatively young and have 
little formal education. FINCA clients each hold, on average, US$233 in savings 
whereas the average loan is US$203, with a recovery rate of 99 percent. FINCA 
charges sufficient interest to be self-sustainable. Its sustainability indicator (Total 
income / Total expenses) was 99 percent in 1998; 105.5 percent in 1999; and 132.2 
percent in August, 2000. 
The business training materials were developed through a collaborative effort 
between FINCA, Atinchik,
2 and Freedom from Hunger (FFH).
3  Although the content of 
the training was similar in both locations, Lima and Ayacucho, they were organized and 
presented differently given the considerable differences in educational levels and in 
                                                 
2 Atinchik, a nine-year old firm, specializes in the generation of training materials in business 
management for micro-entrepreneurs. Atinchik had previously used similar training materials in 
a project for the World Bank.  
3 Since 1995, FFH has provided technical assistance to eighteen MFIs in Asia, Africa, and Latin 
America with its program Credit with Education, a combination of microcredit and educational 
services. Working with independent local partners, FFH provides training in microfinance 
products, MFI capacity building, and adult education in health and business development. Its 
business education curriculum was developed through market assessments using individual 
surveys, focus groups with key informants, pilot-testing, and the feedback of clients and staff. 
5 learning processes
4. In Lima, clients received handouts and did homework, whereas in 
Ayacucho, teaching relied more heavily on visual aids and was sometimes held in 
Quechua. The training materials in Lima were organized in two modules. The first 
module introduced attendees to what a business is, how a business works, and the 
marketplace. Clients were taught to identify their customers, competitors, and the 
position of the business in the marketplace and then learned about product, 
promotional strategies, and commercial planning. The second module explained how to 
separate business and home finances by establishing the differences between income, 
costs, and profit, teaching how to calculate production costs, and product pricing. See 
appendix A for more details on the content of the business training. 
Training began in October, 2002 in Lima and in March, 2003 in Ayacucho and 
was expected to last 22 weekly sessions in total. Each bank timed the beginning of the 
training with the beginning of new loan cycles, so not all banks began training at the 
same time. Ayacucho’s meetings are weekly, whereas in Lima some groups meet 
weekly and others meet bi-weekly. 
The goal of the program is to teach entrepreneurial skills. However, if the 
entrepreneurial “spirit” is a fixed characteristic, teaching an individual to engage in 
activities similar to a successful entrepreneur may not actually lead to improved 
business outcomes. The training aims to improve basic business practices such as 
how to treat clients, how to use profits, where to sell, the use of special discounts, 
credit sales, and the goods and services produced. These improvements should lead 
to more sales, more workers, and could eventually provide incentives to join the formal 
sector.  
In addition to impact on the client, the training could have some indirect effects 
on the institution. The link between loan size, savings and repayment, and the financial 
sustainability of the MFI is straightforward. However, there are other important 
variables such as client retention or dropout rates. First, high dropout rates increase 
the efforts required to achieve economies of scale (Copestake, 2002). On one hand, 
recruiting costs may be high especially in competitive markets. Also, village banks’ 
clients increase their loan size and savings with tenure so that high dropout rates make 
it more difficult for the MFI to increase the portfolio and reduce unit costs. Second, high 
                                                 
4 Among FINCA’s Lima clients, the literacy rate is 98 percent, the majority has a secondary 
education and 40 percent have some post-secondary schooling as well. On the other hand, in 
the Ayacucho region, almost 70 percent of the FINCA clients did not finish secondary school 
and approximately 15 percent are illiterate. 
6 dropout rates may be associated to clients’ unhappiness with the services provided. 
Since training increases the length of the regular meetings by thirty to sixty minutes 
(meetings without education typically last forty to sixty minutes) client retention can be 
negatively affected. In turn, the training, if valued by the clients, could generate more 
client loyalty, which in turn could increase client retention and repayment (due to 
reciprocity, not improved business outcomes).  
3.  The experimental design and the monitoring of the intervention 
We evaluate the effectiveness of integrating business training with microfinance 
services using a randomized-control trial in which pre-existing lending groups were 
assigned randomly to control and treatment groups. Of the 140 village banks (3,265 
clients) in Ayacucho, 55 were assigned to a mandatory treatment group (clients had to 
stay through the training at their weekly bank meeting
5), 34 were assigned to a 
voluntary treatment group (clients were allowed to leave after their loan payment was 
made, before the training began), and 51 were assigned to a control group which 
received no additional services beyond the credit and savings program. In Lima, of 99 
FINCA-sponsored banks (1,326 clients), 49 were assigned to mandatory treatment and 
50 were assigned to control (there was no “voluntary’ treatment group in Lima). The 
randomization was stratified by credit officer; hence each credit officer has the same 
proportion of treatment and control groups. 
We monitored the attendance at the weekly meetings and the training sessions. 
On average, training sessions in mandatory training banks had an 88 percent 
attendance rate while attendance in voluntary banks was 76 percent.
6  S e v e r a l  
unexpected events were observed during implementation. First, some treatment banks 
dropped the trainings if they were having problems such as high default and drop out 
rates. In these cases, they would often enter a restructuring phase that involved 
reinforcement of the traditional FINCA training about good repayment practices and 
discipline. The training session was also skipped during the first and last meeting of 
each cycle, and when the meeting was paired with a group activity such as the 
celebration of birthdays and regional and religious holidays. In these cases, the session 
would be postponed until the following meeting. There were other cases in which the 
                                                 
5 Fines were applied for absence or tardiness, and could result in expulsion from the bank. 
6 Attendance in voluntary banks gradually slowed from an average of 80 percent at the 
beginning to 70 percent in the last two cycles observed. The number of training sessions also 
dropped over time. 
7 clients and credit officers decided that they needed more time to fully grasp the 
information offered in one session. In some cases, it became a normal practice for 
banks to agree to spend an extra meeting reviewing the material of the previous 
training session.
7 
These practices not only delayed the completion of the training materials, but 
also caused heterogeneity in exposure to training across banks. In Lima, for example, 
the average bank advanced 3.5 sessions per loan cycle over the 12-meeting cycles. 
However, it was common for banks to complete five training sessions in the first loan 
cycle, and slow to an average of 2.6 training sessions per cycle over time. As a result, 
after at least 24 months since the launch of the training, only half the banks had 
reached the 17
th session out of a total of 25 programmed sessions. The empirical 
analysis will first compare the village banks assigned to treatment to those assigned to 
control, irrespective of how well they adhered to the training program (the ITT 
estimate). This is important not only to avoid a selection bias, but also because the 
delays experienced here are normal for credit with education programs. Had the 
training been adhered to more strictly, we would be estimating the impact of a 
treatment that is stronger than is normally implemented. Nevertheless, after we analyze 
the determinants of the level of exposure by clients assigned to treatment groups, we 
do analyze TOT estimates, obtained by using ITT as an identifying variable.  
4.  Data and methods 
This evaluation uses three key data sources: FINCA financial-transaction data, 
a baseline survey before the randomization results were announced, and a follow-up 
survey up to two years later. 
Financial-transaction data are from FINCA’s database, which contains the 
reports of all the transactions made by each bank client at every scheduled meeting 
since 1999. It includes information on the loan cycles, broken down by loan payment, 
interest, mandatory and voluntary savings, fines for tardiness, and contributions to 
cover default of other members. The database also includes some socio-economic 
characteristics of the clients, such as age, education, and main business or economic 
activity, registered when the client first joined a FINCA-sponsored village bank. 
The baseline and follow-up surveys included a variety of questions on the 
                                                 
7 In the case of Lima, such revisions often implied using the sessions to work in groups, with the 
support from the credit officer, on the assigned homework. 
8 socio-demographic characteristics and other general information about the client’s 
household and business. Outcomes can be divided into four categories: (1) institutional 
outcomes; (2) business processes, knowledge and savings practices (i.e., testing 
whether the specific practices taught in the training were adopted); (3) business 
outcomes; and (4) household outcomes, including empowerment in decision-making 
and child labor (the Lima follow-up survey included questions related to the time 
children between six and fifteen years old dedicate to domestic work and school 
activities). The full list of outcome variables and their definitions are included in 
appendix table 1.  
Figure 1: Timeline of the intervention and data collection 
 
In treatment banks, the baseline survey was given immediately before the bank 
began the training. Figure 1 above shows the timeline of these components of the 
study for Ayacucho and Lima. Most baseline surveys were completed just before or 
after the client’s weekly meeting although, due to time constraints, some of them had to 
be applied at their home or place of business, after scheduling an appointment with the 
microentrepreneur
8. In Ayacucho, we used four surveyors for 3,265 surveys, while in 
Lima, we used six surveyors for 1,326 surveys. 
Seventy-six percent of the clients in the baseline survey were reached and 
surveyed for the follow-up survey. For the 62 percent of the clients interviewed in the 
baseline who were no longer members of a FINCA-sponsored community bank when 
the follow-up surveys began, we located them using addresses collected in the 
baseline survey or, in some cases, asking neighbors or FINCA members. However, 
some clients had moved away, were impossible to locate, or refused to be interviewed. 
In total, we interviewed 83 percent of remaining FINCA members, and about 72 
percent of those who had dropped out of FINCA during the intervening period. As table 
                                                 
8  The ratio of surveys applied right after the periodic meetings of the village banks to those in 
the household/business is similar in Lima and Ayacucho. 
9 7 shows, there was a survey response bias in Lima but not in Ayacucho, where control 
group individuals were more likely to complete the survey. This may be due to the 
training itself taking a long time, so individuals were less willing to spend the extra time 
to complete the survey. Also, among those who dropped out, the response rate is 
higher for the control group than the treatment group
9. 
Table 1 shows some key demographic characteristics and financial-transaction 
history of the members of control and treatment groups before BDS training began. 
These results verify that the random assignment produced observably similar treatment 
and control groups. At the time of the randomization, data were available on prior 
repayment rates, the average loan size, and the average savings size. The remaining 
variables were not observed at the time of the randomization, but are also similar 
across treatment and control groups, as expected. 
To obtain the ITT estimate of the impact of the business training program, we 
use the first-difference (FD) or the double-difference (DD) estimators, depending on 
whether we observe the outcome of interest only in the follow-up, or in both the 
baseline and follow-up survey. The FD estimator is obtained by comparing the levels of 
the outcomes variables between clients in the treatment and control groups. In turn, the 
DD estimator is obtained from comparing changes over time in a particular outcome 
variable between treatment and control groups. As long as the control and treatment 
groups were similar ex-ante, which was assured through the randomization, we can 
argue that both estimators can provide an unbiased estimate of the impact of the ITT 
with a business training program on a particular outcome variable. In practice though, 
the inclusion of baseline controls in randomized experiments tends to increase 
precision of the estimates of treatment effects
10. Thus, in this study we only report FD 
estimates when we failed to collect information on the outcome at baseline, which is 
often true for the variables associated with business practices and knowledge. 
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9 This attrition, if non-random, may bias the estimated treatment effects presented here for 
business practices and results. However, notice that institutional outcomes are not affected as 
for them we use institutional data. 
10 See Duflo, Glennester and Kremer (2007), section 4.4. The same is true for the inclusion of 
other covariates that have large effects on the outcome. 
10 where   denotes an outcome variable for client i in bank j after the treatment, 
 is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the client belonged to a treatment 






11.  ij ε  denotes the error term which, since we randomize banks rather 
than clients, is assumed to be independent across banks but not necessarily within 
them
12. Thus, β  measures the difference between the treatment and control groups in 
the outcome Y after the treatment, and is a consistent estimate of the average impact 
of being assigned to a treatment group on the outcome variable Y . 
If the outcome variable is a dummy variable, then we estimate a probit model 




Y . In the model with interactions, the marginal effect for those with   is 
obtained by estimating 
0 = X
() ( ) [ ] 0 , 0 | 1 r P ˆ 0 , 1 | r P ˆ = = = − = = X D Y X D 1 = Y . For those 
clients for whom  1 = X , the marginal effect of treatment on those clients with  1 = X  is 
obtained with the following expression:  ( ) ( ) [ ] 1 , 0 = X | 1 r P ˆ 1 , 1 | 1 r P ˆ = − = = = D Y X D Y = . 
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where   is a binary variable equal to one if the observation corresponds to 
the post-treatment time period. Then, 
t Post
3 β  is the double difference estimator of the 
program’s impact on outcome Y . 
Since we find high heterogeneity in actual exposure to treatment, we also 
include the TOT effects, which tells us the local average treatment effect (LATE) on a 
specific indicator of having actually received the business training (Imbens and Angrist, 
1994) due to random assignment. To obtain the TOT estimate of the impact of 
business training, we estimate equations (1) and (2), but replace the treatment dummy 
by another that indicates actual exposure to treatment by individual clients in randomly 
                                                 
11  The set of covariates included variables such as the clients’ age and education, the number 
of loans received from FINCA, business type and size, and branch location. Since treatment 
was assigned randomly, we would expect the insertion of these covariates to reduce, without 
bias, the variance of the estimated effect. 
12 Thus, we use the Huber-White covariance matrix estimator to obtain the standard error of our 
coefficients of interest. 
11 assigned treatment banks
13. Since actual treatment is not randomly assigned, we use 
ITT as an instrumental variable to identify these effects. We report the TOT results with 
two thresholds: one at zero and another one at 8 sessions. In the latter case, we 
consider as untreated any individual that attended less than 8 sessions, of a total of 22. 
5.  Impact of Business Training: ITT Estimates 
We divide the analysis into three categories of outcome variables:  
(1) institutional outcomes; 
(2) business processes; and 
(3) business outcomes. 
5.1 Institutional  results 
We found important effects in the institutional outcomes, as loan repayment and 
client retention are higher among treatment groups (Table 2). We looked at the 
repayment history of clients in treatment and control groups since training started and 
found that the former had three percentage points higher probability of maintaining a 
clean repayment history, that is, that they never finished a cycle with a debt larger than 
their cumulative savings. One explanation for improved repayment would be the 
increase in business income to cover loan payments, and as we shall see below, such 
impacts were also detected. 
With respect to client retention, 61 percent of the clients left FINCA banks at 
some point since the training started but one out of four of those returned to FINCA 
before the follow-up survey. We find the business training reduces these exits by five 
percentage points although no effect was found for permanent dropouts. We infer from 
the retention results that clients place high value on the training they receive, causing 
them to avoid temporary exits, remaining with the program longer than controls. On the 
other hand, treatment clients are more likely to cite the length of weekly meetings as a 
factor in dropping out of the program (Appendix Table 2). So while in net the business 
training is good for client retention, the program can expect to lose some clients due to 
lengthier meetings. 
Another possible explanation for the increase in client retention for the 
                                                 
13 In the case of DD estimates we actually replace specification (2) with another one that 
includes the change observed between the baseline and the follow-up. 
12 treatment group is the improvement of clients’ business outcomes, leading to higher 
repayment capability. The increase in client retention could be driven by the reduction 
in default. We examine whether the treatment led to more dropout with default as well 
as dropout without default, and although the treatment effect is larger in reducing 
dropout without default, when disaggregated neither is significant statistically. Similarly, 
we do not find any effect on the amount of solidarity discounts, which correspond to the 
joint liability within the bank in case of individual default problems. 
The improved default and client retention have strong implications for the 
profitability of the institution. Although FINCA faces negligible defaults rates, that is not 
because individual businesses do not face problems, but is rather the result of the 
group liability mechanism and the use of their cumulative savings. Thus, our finding is 
that those individual problems are reduced as a result of business training, which would 
be connected to the increased sales reported below. Institutionally, improved 
repayment contributes to the sustainability of banks as members do not suffer as much 
the burden of the joint liability mechanism that characterizes the village bank 
methodology. 
Improved client retention enhances the sustainability of FINCA by reducing the 
recruiting costs required to increase the scale of its operations and by allowing clients 
to sustain their accumulation of savings and their gradual increase in loan sizes. We do 
not find changes in loan size and accumulated savings, but these results may be 
explained in the short run by increased sales and the implementation of innovations in 
the clients’ businesses. 
5.2  Business skills and practices 
As mentioned above, the training materials were designed to transfer best 
business practices to FINCA clients, with practical examples to ease understanding but 
without including specific advice to clients´ business problems. Hence, we want to 
check whether clients captured the key concepts and implemented corresponding 
changes in their businesses. In the follow-up survey we asked clients questions about 
key elements of the training, such as business knowledge, marketing strategies, what 
to do with profits and record-keeping (see Appendix Table 1 for the full list of survey 
questions and variable definitions). 
Table 3 shows the results on these outcome measures. Training participants 
demonstrated greater business knowledge, answering more questions correctly (10 
13 percentage points, which is 0.07 standard deviations). The greater knowledge 
displayed by the treatment group did in fact translate into better business practices, 
though only in limited fields. The training increased the likelihood that individuals 
reinvested profits in their business by four percentage points (0.08 standard 
deviations), maintained sales records for their business by three-four percentage points 
(0.07 standard deviations), and maintained withdrawal records from their business by 
seven percentage points (0.17 standard deviations). Lastly, individuals were asked to 
identify problems of their businesses, and to name changes or innovations they have 
planned and implemented to their businesses over the prior year. We found that those 
in the treatment group were five percentage points more likely to report having 
implemented changes to improve their businesses. 
5.3 Business  results 
The improved business knowledge and reported changes in business practices 
indeed led to higher business revenues. Table 4 presents the results on the level and 
variation in sales, profit margins, as well as the employment within the enterprise. 
Sales in the month prior to the surveys were 16 percent higher. When looking at the 
variation in sales, we find the largest effect for sales in a bad month, which is 28 
percent higher among treatment groups compared to control groups. We infer from this 
latter result that the training has helped clients by enhancing their ability to identify 
strategies to reduce the fluctuations in their sales. For instance, they could have 
diversified the goods and services they offer or have identified clients with a different 
seasonality in their purchases. The improved cash flow also may have reduced their 
seasonal demand for credit helping to explain the lack of impact of the training on loan 
size in Table 2. 
For retail business, no change in profit margin was observed on the most 
common product sold. Due to time and reliability constraints, we only asked about profit 
margin for the main product. However, unless the profit margin was reduced on other 
products despite not decreasing on the main product, the increased overall revenue 
implies an increase in profits. For service businesses, since no change in labor was 
observed, the increased revenue should roughly translate to increased profits. 
14 6.  Impact of Business Training: Heterogeneous Exposure to Treatment and 
the TOT estimates 
As indicated above, the ITT estimates reported in section 5 are consistent 
estimates of the average impact of business training on those randomly selected to 
treatment, considering normal implementation circumstances that include delays and 
individual dropouts, which generate heterogeneous exposure to treatment. However, it 
would still be interesting to obtain the impact of business training on clients actually 
treated, as it would more closely reflect what would happen if we are able to adjust 
delivery mechanisms in such a way that all clients are homogeneously exposed to full 
treatment. In the following section, we describe the heterogeneity in exposure to 
treatment by individual clients, and then report the TOT estimates on business 
knowledge, practices, and results. 
6.1  Heterogeneous exposure to treatment 
Not all the clients randomly selected to treatment groups were equally exposed 
to business training. This heterogeneity came as a result of individual and/or bank 
factors. In this section, we analyze the level of exposure to treatment by female 
microentrepreneurs in treatment banks. Second, we proceed to identify the factors that 
could explain individual’s level of exposure. 
Bank factors can help explain heterogeneity in exposure to training modules. As 
mentioned above, some treatment banks dropped the training even before starting 
because they were having problems such as high default and drop out rates. Progress 
was also delayed because training sessions were skipped the weeks of the first and 
last meeting of each cycle, and when the meeting was paired with a group activity such 
as the celebration of birthdays and regional and religious holidays. There were other 
cases in which the clients and credit officers decided that they needed an extra session 
to fully grasp the information offered in one particular session. Thus, in Ayacucho, only 
7.5 percent of the banks in the mandatory treatment group have already completed the 
program (27 sessions). Moreover, 60 percent of the banks in the voluntary treatment 
group have not received any session of the training program
14. Nevertheless, excluding 
banks that never started with training modules, we find a significant but small difference 
in the number of sessions received in mandatory and voluntary treatment groups. 
                                                 
14 Only 5.5 percent of the banks in the mandatory treatment group did not start the training at all. 
15 While the first group completed 23 sessions on average, banks in the voluntary group 
reached only to the 19th session of the program. In Lima, 20 percent of the banks have 
already completed the 25-session training program. On the other hand, 14.3 percent of 
the banks did not start the training at all. Excluding non-starting banks, the rest of the 
treatment banks in Lima have, on average, completed 16 sessions. 
Banks could agree to take measures to delay progress of business training, but 
individuals could also take decisions to skip attendance to training sessions. The first 
obvious measure is dropping out from the bank entirely, but attendance can also be 
managed while remaining as a bank member
15. In Ayacucho, 34 banks were randomly 
assigned to a group in which treatment was voluntary. With training sessions occurring 
after the ordinary payment meeting, individual clients were allowed to leave if they 
wanted to. Even in the case of banks for which training was mandatory, we received 
information that clients could skip training by arriving late to the payment meetings or 
by nominating a representative to make their payments. Considering these bank and 
individual factors, the measurement of exposure should be made at the individual level, 
summarizing information from both bank progress and individual attendance rates 
while the person was a member of a treatment bank. Graph 1 and 2 show the 
distribution of this measurement for Ayacucho and Lima, respectively.  
Next, we try to identify the characteristics of the banks and individuals that 
determine high exposure to business training. For that, we first classify individuals in 
two groups according to their level of exposure to treatment. In Ayacucho, any client 
that had less than 8 training sessions was classified as having had low exposure to 
business training. The threshold was set at 12 sessions for Lima clients. With that 
classification, we run a probit model to evaluate the determinants of high exposure to 
treatment. When using a pooled sample, client’s tenure by the beginning of the training 
has by far the biggest effect influencing the level of exposure: clients that stay in FINCA 
between one and two years after the intervention was launched are 49 percentage 
points more likely to be highly exposed to the treatment
16. Moreover, clients that stay in 
the program for more than two years increase their probability of being highly exposed 
by 70 percentage points. Bank characteristics by the beginning of training also show a 
                                                 
15 See in Table 2 that 45 percent of the clients present at the moment the intervention took off 
dropped out of the village bank, and have not returned by the time of the follow up. An 
additional 15 percent left the bank for one or two cycles before returning. 
16 These pooled regressions are not reported here but can be made available to the reader 
upon request. 
16 significant but small effect. Apparently, clients in banks with serious default problems 
are less likely to progress in the training modules while clients in mandatory treatment 
banks (Ayacucho) are more likely to be highly exposed to the training. 
In Table 5 we run separate regressions for locations and type of treatment in 
Ayacucho. It is clear that the highest effect of client’s permanence appears in Lima, 
where banks were more likely to progress in the modules. On the other hand, 
mandatory training is the most important factor determining exposure in Ayacucho. The 
analysis of the determinants of high exposure confirm the suspicion that actual 
treatment is not randomly assigned, but endogenously determined by characteristics of 
the individuals and the banks in which they participate. With these results in mind, we 
next show the TOT estimates of the impact of business training on the business 
knowledge, practices, and results of those that were actually exposed to treatment. 
6.2  TOT estimates of the impact of business training 
We obtain TOT estimates by running regressions associated to equations (1) or 
(2) on actual exposure to treatment, using ITT as an instrumental variable to correct for 
the endogeneity of the decision to receive training for those initially assigned randomly 
to the treatment group. Table 6 presents the results on selected outcomes of using two 
thresholds to define actual exposure
17. In the second column, we considered as 
actually treated any client that had attended at least one training session. In the third 
column, we raise the threshold to eight training sessions. 
We find that TOT estimates are substantially larger than ITT ones for those 
variables that were found to have significant ITT effects. For instance, the impact of 
business training on repayment rises from 0.03 to 0.04 and becomes significant when 
considering as actually treated those clients that had at least eight training sessions. 
The effect on the use of profits for business growth rises from 0.04 to 0.06. In the case 
of business knowledge index, the effect of business training rises from 0.1 to 0.18. 
Also, business sales during bad months increased by 33 percent for those clients that 
had at least eight training sessions, an effect almost twice as large as the obtained with 
the ITT estimate. 
We interpret these results as a confirmation of the robustness of the ITT effects, 
                                                 
17 Minor differences between ITT estimates reported in table 6 and those in tables 2-4 
correspond to the fact that in the former we use as dependent variable the change between 
baseline and follow-up, rather than specification (2). 
17 and also as an indication that business training could have even larger average effects 
if delivery mechanisms were adjusted so that all clients can be fully treated. As a local 
average treatment effect, we cannot assure that those effects would be equally large 
for those that were not actually exposed to the training. However, it would be 
interesting to test the impact of this kind of training if delivery mechanisms can indeed 
be so adjusted. 
7. Conclusion 
The impact evaluation performed for this study offers encouraging news to 
those that focus on the promotion of the growth of small and micro-enterprises in 
developing countries. The transmission of key successful business practices to female 
microentrepreneurs with access to credit can help both the client´s business and the 
microfinance institution. Training led to better business practices and increased 
revenues and profits. Clients report engaging in some of the exact activities being 
taught in the program: separating money between business and household, reinvesting 
profits in the business, maintaining records of sales and expenses, and thinking 
proactively about new markets and opportunities for profits. The implementation of 
these strategies seemed to have helped clients increase business income, mainly by 
smoothing fluctuations between good and bad periods. 
Also, we find positive impacts on repayment rates and client retention for 
FINCA, the lender. Clients appear to be more satisfied with the additional services that 
the training program offers them (as indicated by the higher client retention rates). 
Thus, this was a successful intervention also from the perspective of the MFI. Although 
we do not have access to specific cost estimates for the implemented business training 
module, Freedom from Hunger has found that the marginal cost to organizations is 
around 6 to 9 percent of total costs. The marginal revenue will come from the increased 
client retention and repayment rates (no change in loan sizes was observed). The fixed 
cost of managing a village bank is high, but the variable cost of each individual client is 
quite low. The improved client retention rate (sixteen percent improvement in client 
retention) generates more increased revenue than the marginal cost of providing the 
training. The benefits of improved client repayment are more difficult to estimate, since 
the true benefit to FINCA comes through lower enforcement costs (the eventual default 
18 is virtually nonexistent). Thus, this seems like a profitable undertaking for FINCA
18.  
With respect to the demand for business training, we find that there was 
significant heterogeneity in exposure to treatment. Although the main factor behind 
these differences had to do with the decision to remain as a FINCA client, client 
retention has been a problem for many village banks around the world, and the training 
actually reduced dropouts. Some other bank characteristics were important though, in 
particular that the bank had serious default problems. In that sense, it is plausible to 
assume that our intention to treat measure captures the way these “credit with 
education” programs are normally delivered within village banks. 
Overall, we suggest that this program evaluation exercise is a necessary one. 
Moreover, further experimentation is needed to confirm the replicability of some of the 
weaker results found here in other contexts. Larger effects on those actually treated 
suggest the plausibility of further exploring the average impact of this kind of training if 
delivery mechanisms are adjusted so that all clients can be fully treated. Another key 
issue to explore is whether credit officers are the appropriate agents through whom we 
want to transfer business skills to microfinance clients as the economies of scope may 
be overturned by the advantages of specialization. Finally, it is also clear that 
extensions of this analysis should include the analysis of heterogeneity of treatment 
effects and further exploration of potential biases associated to non-random attrition. 
                                                 
18 An additional warning should be made regarding this statement as likely FFH estimates have 
not included opportunity costs for the time of the credit officer which could have even more 
profitable alternative occupations. 
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 Table 1: Ex-ante differences between clients by location 
 Treatment Control Difference  T-stat 
Tenure in FINCA (Cycles)             
Lima 5.2 5.2 0.0  0.030 
Ayacucho 6.0 5.8 -0.2  -1.220 
Years of Education     
Lima 9.9 9.7 0.2  0.946 
Ayacucho 8.1 8.1 0.0  0.009 
Age    
Lima 42.6 42.3 0.3  0.529 
Ayacucho 36.3 36.5 -0.2  -0.510 
Loan Size (external account)
a/ b/   
Lima 293 308 15  1.09 
Ayacucho 173 167 -6  -0.85 
Accumulated Savings 
a/ b/    
Lima 174.9 185.2 -10.3  -0.703 
Ayacucho 360.4 348.6 11.7  0.577 
Default Rate 
b/    
Lima 0.04 0.03 0.01  1.126 
Ayacucho 0.02 0.02 0.00  0.604 
Drop out Rate 
b/    
Lima 22.5 23.3 -0.8  -0.37 
Ayacucho 22.8 23.4 -0.6  -0.47 
Last week sales (log)     
Lima 7.4 7.4 0.0  -0.071 
Ayacucho 6.3 6.3 0.0  -0.086 
Number of total workers      
Lima 1.2 1.2 0.0  -0.202 
Ayacucho 0.8 0.8 0.0  0.793 
Number of paid workers      
Lima 0.4 0.3 0.1  0.894 
Ayacucho 0.2 0.2 0.0  0.442 
Ex-ante high interest in training     
Lima 0.6 0.6 0.0  0.446 
Ayacucho 0.4 0.4 0.0  0.797 
Source: FINCA-Peru historical database and baseline client survey. 
Averages were calculated for the cycle before the BDS training program was started. 
a/ In US $. 
b/ In the last cycle before the beginning of training 
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Double  difference estimate reported 
Loan size 
  212.19 3170 2.35  8.75
 (207.73) (13.692)  (12.911)
Cumulative savings 
  304.45 3170 -11.53  -4.37
 (411.31) (15.839)  (16.027)
First  difference estimate reported (no baseline data available) 
Repayment
  0.80 3170 0.03  0.03*
 (0.40) (0.022)  (0.020)
Dropout         
Permanent/Temporary Dropout  0.61 3170 -0.04  -0.05*
 (0.49) (0.026)  (0.026)
Permanent Dropout  0.45 3170 -0.02  -0.03
 (0.50) (0.025)  (0.026)
Fines   0.03 2785 0.10  0.12
 (3.20) (0.130)  (0.133)
Solidarity discounts
   0.44 2785 -0.22  -0.19
 (5.71) (0.435)  (0.403)
Each coefficient reported in the table is from a separate regression. * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Standard errors clustered by village bank in parentheses. 
Marginal effects reported for probit specifications (repayment, client retention, and all dropout 
variables). 
a/ See Appendix table 1 for a definition of each dependent variables. 
b/ The covariates include location (Ayacucho or Lima), business activity, business size, age, 
schooling and number of FINCA loans received by the client. Table 3: Impact of training on business practices - OLS, Probit 
Dependent variable
 a/ 












Double difference estimate reported 
Tax formality
  0.15  2981  0.01    0.01 
 (0.36)    (0.012)    (0.012) 
Paid fixed salary to self  0.04  2815  -0.02    -0.02 
 (0.20)    (0.019)    (0.019) 
Keeping records of:           
Sales
  0.29  2903  0.03*    0.04* 
 (0.45)    (0.020)    (0.022) 
Withdrawals (Lima only)
    0.11  677  0.06    0.06 
 (0.31)    (0.042)    (0.043) 
Number of sales locations   1.07  3424  0.01    0.01 
 (0.32)    (0.026)    (0.026) 
Level of diversification           
Number of income sources (Ayacucho only)  2.33  2394  -0.02    -0.02 
 (0.53)    (0.038)    (0.038) 
Allows sales on credit   0.59  3424  -0.002    -0.002 
 (0.49)    (0.015)    (0.015) 
First difference estimate reported (no baseline data available) 
Keeping records of payments to workers
  0.23  2992  0.005    0.004 
  (0.57)   (0.015)    (0.013) 
Business knowledge index
   3.32 3427  0.10*    0.08 
   (1.40)    (0.060)    (0.055) 
Started new business
  0.14  3427  -0.02    -0.02 
 (0.35)    (0.012)    (0.012) 
Level of diversification           
Importance of main product 
  2.31  2221  0.01    0.01 
 (0.70)    (0.034)    (0.035) 
Profit used for business growth   0.67  3427  0.04**    0.04** 
 (0.47)    (0.020)    (0.019) 
Thinking of keeping business safe when taking 
money from it    0.26 3427  -0.002    -0.0002 
 (0.44)    (0.016)    (0.015) 
Proportion of clients who faced problems with 
business (Lima only)  0.65  1033  0.02    0.02 
 (0.48)    (0.034)    (0.034) 
Proportion of clients who:            
Planned innovations in their businesses  0.65  3427  0.02    0.03 
 (0.48)    (0.019)    (0.018) 
Executed innovations in their businesses  0.39  3427  0.05**    0.05** 
 (0.49)      (0.020)    (0.019)   
Each coefficient reported in the table is from a separate regression. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1%. Standard errors clustered by village bank in parentheses. Marginal effects 
reported for probit specifications (tax formality, profit used for business growth, thinking of keeping 
business safe when taking money from it  fixed salary, keeping records, started new business, allowing 
sales on credit and proportion of clients who faced problems/planned innovations/executed innovations). 
a/ See Appendix table 1 for a definition of each dependent variables.  
b/ The covariates include location (Ayacucho or Lima), business activity, business size, age, schooling and 
number of FINCA loans received by the client. 
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Dependent variable
 a/ 










Double difference estimate reported 
Sales              
Last month (log)   6.60 2806 0.16  **  0.16 ** 
 (1.56) (0.078)    (0.078)  
Good month  7.92 2806 0.00    0.00  
 (1.26) (0.051)    (0.051)  
Normal month  7.16 2806 0.10  *  0.10 * 
 (1.19) (0.052)    (0.052)  
Bad month  5.92 2806 0.27  ***  0.27 *** 
 (2.25) (0.099)    (0.100)  
Difference good-bad month  2.01 2806 -0.26  **  -0.26 ** 
 (2.02) (0.103)    (0.103)  
Number of workers       
Total   1.99 2956 0.01    0.01  
 (1.46) (0.065)    (0.065)  
Paid workers, not family 
members 0.26 2954 -0.04    -0.04  
 (1.04)   (0.046)      (0.046)   
First difference estimate reported 
Weekly profit from main product   11.87 1759 1.84    1.71  
 (46.34) (2.275)    (2.139)  
Each coefficient reported in the table is from a separate regression. * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Standard errors clustered by village bank in parentheses.  
a/ See Appendix table 1 for a definition of each dependent variables. 
b/ The covariates include location (Ayacucho or Lima), business activity, business size, age, 
schooling and number of FINCA loans received by the client. 
 



















0 10 20 30


















0 5 10 15 20
Voluntary treatment: Number of adjusted classes
 
a/ Individual attendance is calculated as the number of classes that the client was exposed to 
during her tenure in the treatment bank, adjusted by percentage of classes attended. 



















0 5 10 15 20
Treatment: Number of adjusted classes
 





















Low Exposed High exposed Didn't begin
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Lima  All 
Treatment Mandatory Voluntary
Age [30 - 50]  0.002   0.054 0.075  0.003
 (0.013) (0.034) (0.040)*  (0.019)
Age [more than 50]  -0.004 0.017 0.017  0.005
 (0.014) (0.047) (0.067)  (0.021)
Higher education  0.010 -0.022 -0.011  -0.010
 (0.012) (0.031) (0.050)  (0.009)
Married -0.005 -0.028 0.016  -0.046
 (0.010) (0.031) (0.046)  (0.022)**
Business size  0.007 -0.024 -0.022  -0.014
 (0.007) (0.027) (0.039)  (0.014)
Bs. activity (prepared food)  0.017 -0.032 -0.045  0.008
 (0.017) (0.046) (0.077)  (0.019)
Bs. activity (services)  0.020 0.039 0.006  0.018
 (0.020) (0.071) (0.097)  (0.031)
Bs. activity (production)  0.000 0.024 0.007  0.031
 (0.012) (0.062) (0.095)  (0.034)
Ex-ante high interest in training  -0.014 -0.014 -0.006  -0.006
 (0.009) (0.031) (0.044)  (0.016)
Mandatory training  0.516  
 (0.032)***  
Bank w/ high default rate (ex ante)  -0.014 -0.056 -0.008  -0.052
 (0.011) (0.040) (0.054)  (0.026)**
Bank w/ high dropout rate (ex ante)  -0.018 -0.020 -0.106  0.045
 (0.014) (0.052) (0.058)*  (0.030)
Client's ex post tenure [1 - 2 yrs]  0.993 0.393 0.406  0.042
 (0.002)*** (0.045)*** (0.043)***  (0.033)
Client's ex post tenure [+ than 2 yrs]  0.985 0.654 0.699  0.136
   (0.006)***   (0.039)*** (0.033)***  (0.053)**
Observations 585 1573 963  610
# highly exposed  214 564 521  43
Log likelihood  -236.5   -590.7 -436.2  -127.5
Standard errors in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
a/  Includes people whose banks started the training. 
b/ Dependent and independent variables are defined identically to those in the previous table. 
  26Table 6: Impact of training on selected outcomes - Intention to treat (ITT) vs. Treatment 
on the treated (TOT) 
Dependent variable
 a/ ITT  TOT 
d/ TOT  2
d/ e/ 
Repayment 0.03 0.04*  0.04**
 (0.022) (0.027)  (0.024)
Profit used for business growth 
b/ 0.04** 0.05**  0.06**
 (0.020) (0.025)  (0.029)
Keeping records of sales 
b/ 0.03* 0.05*  0.07*
 (0.020) (0.026)  (0.036)
Business knowledge index
 b/ 0.10* 0.12*  0.18*
 (0.060) (0.068)  (0.103)
Executed innovations in their businesses 
b/  0.05** 0.06** 0.08**
 (0.020) (0.024)  (0.034)
Last month sales (log)
c/ 0.09 0.10  0.17
 (0.064) (0.069)  (0.107)
Good month (log) 
c/ 0.02 0.02  0.04
 (0.051) (0.060)  (0.106)
Normal month (log) 
c/ 0.09* 0.11*  0.18*
 (0.052) (0.063)  (0.110)
Bad month (log) 
c/ 0.18** 0.21**  0.33**
 (0.082) (0.093)  (0.132)
Difference good-bad month (log) 
c/ -0.16** -0.21**  -0.29**
 (0.080) (0.097)  (0.125)
Number of workers
c/ 0.00 0.01  0.01
 (0.062) (0.073)  (0.114)
Workers' productivity
 c/ 0.08 0.08  0.14
 (0.069) (0.076)  (0.119)
Client's decision power on: loan & savings 
for hh & business
 c/ -0.04 -0.05  -0.10
   (0.050) (0.060)  (0.107)
Each coefficient reported in the table is from a separate regression. * significant at 10%; ** significant 
at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Standard errors clustered by village bank in parentheses except for 
empowerment results. Marginal effects reported for probit specifications (profit used for business 
growth, keeping records, clients who executed innovations and client's decision power). 
a/ Dependent variables are defined as in tables 2-4. 
b/ First difference estimate without covariates reported. 
c/ Double-difference estimate without covariates reported. 
d/ IV estimation of treatment on the treated (TOT) effect, with intention to treat (ITT) as instrument. 
e/ Treatment is re-defined here for clients who effectively received more than about 8 sessions of 
training (duration of the first module).  
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Table 7. Response rate 
  Treatment Control Difference T-stat 
Global 75.2  77.9 -2.7 2.060 ** 
By Location     
Lima 77.2  83.5 -6.2 2.845 ***
Ayacucho 74.5  74.8 -0.3 0.170  
By 
permanence          
Clients 83.2  83.9 -0.6 0.339  
Ex-clients 69.9  74.2 -4.3 2.436 ***
Table 8. Pre intervention characteristics, by attrition status 
  Global 
Characteristics   Reached 
Not 
reached Difference  T-stat 
Age                
less than 30  0.23 0.33 -0.11 -7.207 *** 
[30 - 50]  0.57 0.52 0.05 3.129 *** 
more than 50  0.21 0.15 0.05 3.962 *** 
Education level           
None   0.08 0.08 0.00 0.014  
Primary  0.29 0.29 0.00 0.085  
Secondary  0.42 0.41 0.01 0.345  
Higher  0.22 0.23 -0.01 -0.446  
Language (Spanish = 1)  0.80 0.79 0.01 0.987  
Married  0.77 0.69 0.08 5.618 *** 
Household size 
b/  5.39 5.05 0.34 4.420 *** 
Location (Lima = 1)  0.31 0.24 0.06 3.986 *** 
Business size 
b/  0.47 0.45 0.02 1.063  
Workers in the business   0.96 0.82 0.14 2.643 *** 
Tax Formality 
b/  0.14 0.12 0.02 1.638 * 
Economic activity    
Commerce  0.71 0.76 -0.05 -2.928 *** 
Prepared food  0.11 0.10 0.01 0.756  
Services  0.07 0.07 0.01 0.933  
Production  0.10 0.07 0.03 2.847 *** 
Dropped out ever since beginning of 
training 
a/  0.64 0.90 -0.26 
-
16.500 *** 
Dropped out permanently 
 b/  0.49 0.80 -0.32 
-
18.601 *** 
Defaulted ever since beginning of training 
a/  0.19 0.24 -0.05 -3.689 *** 
High interest in training 
b/  0.46 0.45 0.01 0.484   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
a/ Variables are defined as follows. Dropped out ever since beginning of training: Binary variable equal 
to one if client had ever left a FINCA bank ever since the beginning of the training. Defaulted ever 
since beginning of training: Binary variable equal to one if client’s weekly payments had not cover 
loan's principal and interests, and mandatory savings at least once since the beginning of the training.  
b/ Variables are defined identically to those in previous tables in this section.  Table 9. Pre intervention characteristics, by attrition status and location 
 Ayacucho    Lima 
Characteristics 
a/  Reached Not 
reached  Difference T-stat   Reached  Not 
reached  Difference T-stat 
Age                                  
less than 30  0.28 0.40 -0.12 -6.289 *** 0.10 0.14 -0.04 -1.657 **
[30 – 50]  0.53 0.47 0.06 3.123 *** 0.65 0.65 0.00 -0.125
more than 50  0.19 0.13 0.05 3.529 *** 0.25 0.21 0.04 1.359 *
Education level   
None   0.10 0.09 0.01 0.541 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.217
Primary 0.32 0.32 0.00 0.120 0.22 0.19 0.02 0.880
Secondary 0.36 0.38 -0.02 -0.955 0.53 0.49 0.04 1.140
Higher 0.22 0.21 0.01 0.668 0.24 0.30 -0.07 -2.216
Language (Spanish = 1)  0.72 0.72 -0.01 -0.315  
Married 0.75 0.68 0.08 4.317 *** 0.81 0.72 0.09 3.296 ***
Household size  5.55 5.15 0.40 4.219 *** 5.04 4.74 0.30 2.316 **
Business size   0.47 0.43 0.04 1.993 ** 0.47 0.52 -0.05 -1.415 *
Workers in the business  0.83 0.69 0.15 2.456 *** 1.23 1.21 0.02 0.203
Tax Formality   0.11 0.09 0.02 1.651 ** 0.22 0.23 -0.01 -0.325
Economic activity   
Commerce 0.75 0.78 -0.03 -1.644 * 0.62 0.68 -0.07 -1.974 **
Prepared food  0.10 0.10 0.00 -0.062 0.14 0.11 0.03 1.132
Services 0.07 0.06 0.01 0.678 0.08 0.08 0.01 0.501
Production 0.08 0.05 0.02 2.152 ** 0.16 0.13 0.03 1.192
Dropped out ever since beginning of 
training   0.66 0.95 -0.29
-
16.676 *** 0.60 0.74 -0.15 -4.297 ***
Dropped out permanently   0.49 0.83 -0.35
-
17.869 *** 0.49 0.71 -0.22 -6.313 ***
Defaulted ever since beginning of 
training   0.16 0.22 -0.07 -4.278 *** 0.27 0.31 -0.04 -1.253
High interest in training   0.38 0.39 0.00 0.245    0.64  0.66 -0.02 -0.525  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
a/ Variables are defined identically to those in the previous table. 
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Variable  Description  Time of measurement 
1. Institutional outcomes 
Loan size  Amount borrowed from FINCA's external account at beginning of loan cycle (US$).  Last cycle before and last 
available after the training 
Cumulative savings  Savings balance (voluntary and mandatory) at end of loan cycle.  Last cycle before and last 
available after the training 
Repayment  Binary variable equal to one if, since the beginning of training, the client made all her 
payments on time or had sufficient savings to cover missed payments 
Every cycle since the beginning 
of training 
Permanent and temporary dropout  Binary variable equal to one if client had ever left a FINCA village bank since the beginning 
of the training.   
Permanent dropout  Binary variable equal to one if client had left a FINCA village bank by December 2005.   
Fines  Amount discounted from the savings account for not attending or being late to any of the 
meeting, and/or not making the weekly installment (US$).   
Solidarity discount  Discounts from savings accounts that occur when there is an individual default in the 
external account not covered by defaulter’s individual savings (US$).   
2. Business practices 
Tax formality  Binary variable equal to one if the client has a tax ID number.  BL and FU 
Profits used for business growth  Binary variable equal to one if the client reported re-investing profits for the growth or 
continuity of the business.  FU 
Thinking of keeping business safe 
when taking money from it 
Binary variable equal to one if client considers the needs of the business when taking 
money from the business for family use.  FU 
Fixed salary for herself  Binary variable equal to one if the client pays herself a fixed salary.  BL and FU 
Records sales  Binary variable equal to one if the client records her sales in a registry or notebook.  BL and FU 
Records withdrawals  Binary variable equal to one if the client records her cash and in-kind withdrawals in a 
registry or notebook.  BL and FU 
Records wages  Binary variable equal to one if the client records in a registry or notebook the wage 
payments she makes to workers that are not household members.  FU 
Business knowledge  Number of right answers given by the client when asked about what should be done to 
increase business sales and to plan for a new business.  FU 
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Starting a new business  Binary variable equal to one if the client reports having begun a new business in the last 
year (Ayacucho) or the last two years (Lima).  FU 
Number of sales locations  Number of locations where the client sells the products of her main business.  BL and FU 
Allows credit sales  Binary variable equal to one if the client makes sales on credit.  FU, but recalling situation 12 
months before survey 
Faced problems with business  Binary variable equal to one if the client reported that her business faced a specific problem 
in the last year (Ayacucho) or the last two years (Lima).  FU 
Planned change/innovation  Binary variable equal to one if the client had an idea for a change/innovation to improve the 
business (Ayacucho) or to solve the problems faced (Lima).  FU 
Implemented change/innovation  Binary variable equal to one if the client implemented a change/innovation to improve the 
business (Ayacucho) or to solve the problems faced (Lima).  FU 
3. Business results 
Last week’s sales (log)  Logarithm of sales from the client’s main business in the week preceding each survey.  BL and FU 
Good sales  Sales from the client’s main business in a good month (S/.).  BL and FU 
Normal sales  Sales from the client’s main business in a normal month (S/.).  BL and FU 
Bad sales  Sales from the client’s main business in a bad month (S/.).  BL and FU 
Difference good-bad monthly sales  Difference between sales from the client’s main business in a good month and in a bad 
month (S/.)  BL and FU 
Number of total workers  Number of workers in the main business.  BL and FU 
Paid workers, not family  Number of workers in the main business that are not household members.  BL and FU Appendix Table 2: Post intervention differences for dropout reasons, Ayacucho & Lima 
  Total   Treatment     Control   
  # obs  %    # obs  %    # obs  %   
Difference T-stat 
 
Number of clients  3457     2093 60.54 1364 39.46     
      5-I. Reasons related with the policies and procedures of the FINCA 
program         
Dissatisfied with FINCA's loan terms  227 6.57    131 6.26 94 6.89 -0.633 -0.737   
Dissatisfied with FINCA's saving terms  51 1.48    28 1.34 23 1.69 -0.348 -0.830   
Dissatisfied with the solidarity discounts (only Lima) 
a/ 47 4.42    20 3.68 27 5.19 -1.509 -1.196   
The meetings were too long or too far  (interference with business' 
schedule and/or personal activities)  404 11.69   256 12.23 145 10.63 1.601 1.437  * 
Unequal / bad treatment to bank members  142 4.11    82 3.92 59 4.33 -0.408 -0.592   
Because of the training  0 0.00    0 0.00 0 0.00 0.000 -   
FINCA discovered loans from other institutions (only Ayacucho)  
b/  13 0.54   7 0.45 6 0.71 -0.259 -0.825   
Found an institution with better loan terms  18 0.52    11 0.53 7 0.51 0.012 0.049   
   5-II. Reasons related with the group loans        
The village bank “graduated” (or was dissolved)  30 0.87    14 0.67 13 0.95 -0.284 -0.928   
Personal conflicts in the bank (with other bank members or with the bank's 
president )  170 4.92   106 5.06 63 4.62 0.446 0.594   
   5-III. Reasons related to the client’s business        
No credit needs because of the good situation of the business (sufficient 
capital in the business or the business operates seasonally)  29 0.84   18 0.86 11 0.81 0.054 0.169   
No credit needs/could not pay the loan because of the bad situation of the 
business or other reasons  304 8.79   187 8.93 116 8.50 0.430 0.437   
Closed the business / new activity or job   69 2.00    38 1.82 30 2.20 -0.384 -0.794   
   5-IV. Personal Reasons        
Expenses resulting from a family crisis (i.e. illness) or family event (i.e. 
wedding)  312 9.03   193 9.22 118 8.65 0.570 0.573   
Other personal problems  124 3.59    74 3.54 50 3.67 -0.130 -0.201   
Left the region/went on a long trip   215 6.22    140 6.69 75 5.50 1.190 1.417  * 
A relative influenced the client  37 1.07    23 1.10 14 1.03 0.073 0.202   
   5-V. Reasons due to Environmental Factors        
Environmental / macroeconomic factors   57 1.65    31 1.48 26 1.91 -0.425 -0.959   
   5-VI. Other Reasons        
Other / Did not respond  221 6.39    134 6.40 85 6.23 0.171 0.201    
a/ There are 1063 observations: (543 received treatment)  
b/ There are 2394 observations: (1550 received treatment) 
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In Lima, the training was administered as a two-part program.
19  Module 1, “Training 
for Success,” consists of 15 sessions that introduce the topics of business administration and 
marketing. Classes begin by introducing attendees to what a business is, how a business 
works, and the marketplace. Women are taught to identify their customers, business 
competitors, and the position of the business in the marketplace. Later in the module, 
sessions cover topics on product, price, promotional strategies, and a commercial plan. The 
module also includes review sessions and a business game that participants play in several 
sessions.  
The second module, “Business and Family: Costs and Finances,” consists of 10 
sessions that explain how to separate business and home finances. The classes cover the 
differences between income, costs, and profit, how to calculate production costs, and product 
pricing. Other sessions cover maintaining records of business’ operations, business growth, 
loan repayment, and taxes.  
Every session of these two modules included worksheets on the topics taught for the 
clients to practice and review at the meetings or at home. 
In Ayacucho, the training program was grouped into 3 modules with topics less 
advanced than those taught in Lima.
20  Sessions were presented in 30 minute classes and 
did not used worksheets as in Lima. Module 1, “Manage Your Business Money,” begins by 
defining the differences between money for personal expenses and for the business. Women 
are taught how to calculate profits and about the use of profits for the household and 
business. Sessions cover how to handle selling to customers on credit, how to record 
business expenses, how to prevent losses, and the importance of investing in the business. 
The module also includes a review session. 
Module 2, “Increase Your Sales” begins by providing an overview of five key 
elements in sales: 1) customers; 2) business product or service; 3) product placement; 4) 
pricing; and 5) marketing. Many of the following sessions are dedicated to provide women 
with practical means of applying these concepts. The topics covered include the key 
elements of good customer relations, how to target sales to different types of customers, and 
approaches for varying the types and timing of the products that are sold in order to increase 
sales. Participants are also taught how to identify locations, price goods, and conduct 
                                                 
19 Table A1 provides a list of lessons presented in modules 1 and 2 in Lima.  
20 Table A2 provides a list of lessons presented in modules 1 -3 in Ayacucho. 
  33activities that increase sales and profits. 
The third module, “Plan for a Better Business,” teaches members how to incorporate 
planning into their business. Sessions begin by presenting why planning is beneficial and 
what traits characterize a successful business. Attendees are instructed on how to solve 
business problems and how to introduce new products or changes. Later sessions teach the 
tools needed to prepare a sales plan, calculate business and loan costs, search for new 
resources, and handle unexpected problems and opportunities. 
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Module 1: Training for Success  Module 2: The Business and the Family:  
Costs and Finances 
Session  Title  Session Title 
1  Training for Success  1  The Business and the Family 
2  What is a business?  2  Income, Costs, and Profit 
3  How does a business work?  3  My  Costs  of  Production  and 
Operating Resources 
4  The  Market  4  How Do I Calculate the Cost of 
Production of My Product? 
5  Who are my customers?  5  Prices and Price Equilibrium 
6  Who  are  my  competitors?  6  How to Make a Good Price 
Decision 
7  Review Session 1  7  The Registers and Controls in My 
Business 
8  Business game: Module 1  8  The Growth of My Business 
9  My business’ position in the 
market 
9  Will I Be Able to Pay My Loan? 
10  Product and Price Commercial 
Strategy 
10 Taxes 
11  Marketplace and Promotion 
Commercial Strategy 
  
12 My  Commercial  Plan     
13  Review Session 2     
14  Business Game: Module 2     
15  Business Game: Module 3     
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Appendix A, Table 2: Business training sessions presented in Ayacucho 
Module 1: Manage Your Business 
Money 
Module 2: Increase Your Sales 
Session   Title  Session Title 
1  Separate Business and 
Personal Money 
1 Know  Your  Customers 
2  Use Business Loans for Your 
Business 
2  Treat Your Customers Well 
3  Calculating  Profits  3  Sell to Different Kinds of 
Customers 
4  Track, Plan and Invest Your 
Business Money 
4  Improve Your Products and 
Services 
5  Decide How to Use the Profits 
of the Business to Satisfy the 
Needs of the Business and 
Your Personal Needs 
5  Sell New and Complementary 
Products and Services 
6  Prevent Business Losses  6  Seize Opportunities to Sell 
7  Manage  Credit  Sales  7  Sell Where Customers Buy the 
Most 
8  Review of the Learning 
Sessions of “Manage Your 
Business Money” 
8  Set the Right Price 
    9  Promote Your Business With 
Good Selling Practices 
    10  Plan for Increased Sales 
 
Module 3: Plan for a Better Business 
Session  Title 
1  Use Planning Steps to Grow Your Business 
2  Examine How Your Business Is Doing 
3  Decide How You Can Improve Your Business 
4  Develop and Test New Business Ideas 
5  Plan How Much to Make and Sell 
6  Plan Business Costs 
7  Plan for More Profit 
8  Find Resources for Your Business 
9  Prepare for Unexpected Events 
 